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A paper presented to the 16th Annual Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition 
Research Symposium sketched a theory of how major defense acquisition programs 
(MDAPs) react to changes in the intensity of competition for acquisition funding and 
changes in acquisition policy. Statistical analysis supported the conclusion that average 
cost growth is, as the theory suggests, higher for programs that passed Milestone (MS) B 
in bust funding climates and that average cost growth was reduced by reforms implemented 
by David Packard in 1969.  
The theory also implies that individual program characteristics will similarly respond 
to funding climate and acquisition policy. This implication has not been tested. Doing so 
is the purpose of this presentation using program duration as an example. The data available 
for this study are not ideal and the simple model considered has some inherent limitations. 
Consequently, this presentation should be regarded as an exploratory first effort. 
Program duration (in years) was taken to extend from MS B through the final year in 
which systems were acquired (as reported in the final Selected Acquisition Report). The 
results are based on a sample of 86 MDAPs that passed MS B during the period Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1965–FY 2009. Observations within each of the nine commodity classes 
distinguished are normalized to the mean duration of the commodity class.  
Estimated program duration was found to have a weak negative association with 
funding climate; that is, MDAPs that pass MS B in a boom climate tend to be of shorter 
duration than those that pass MS B in a bust climate. The estimated coefficient of funding 
climate was not statistically significant. In view of the shortcomings of the data, this finding 
is mildly encouraging, however. No statistically significant association between changes 
in acquisition policy and program duration was found.  
The estimated coefficient of a time trend was positive and highly significant. This 
supports the conventional wisdom that program durations have increased over the past few 
decades. A categorical variable was used to differentiate new starts from programs that 
acquired variants or modifications of a system in the inventory or remanufacture (VMR) 
of it. The estimated coefficient of this variable was negative and highly significant; that is, 
as would be expected, VMR programs have shorter schedules than new starts. Two other 
variables were included in the model: (1) the approved quantity in the MS B baseline 
divided by the average approved MS B quantity for the commodity class; and (2) the 
quantity of the system finally acquired divided by the MS B quantity. The first of these is 
a proxy for the MS B schedule, while the second is a proxy for changes in the schedule 
post-MS B. The estimated coefficient of each of these variables is positive, as would be 
iv 
expected, and highly significant. About 26 percent of the variation in program duration for 
the sample is accounted for by the model estimated. 
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Introduction and Agenda
 There is a well-established connection between the cost growth of 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), the intensity of 
competition for funds at Milestone (MS) B, and acquisition reforms 
introduced by David Packard in 1970.
 Schedule, like projected cost, is one of the factors that, within limits, 
can be manipulated during the run-up to MS B to make a program 
look more attractive.
 It is therefore reasonable to examine, as this briefing does, whether 
there is an association between program duration, funding climate, 
and major changes in acquisition policy.
 The bulk of this briefing identifies the variables that go into the 
model.





1. Dependent variable is normalized program duration
2. Conceptual taxonomy that guided specification of the 
independent variables







1.  The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is program duration, from MS B through the 
end of procurement, divided by the average program duration of 
programs in the same commodity group.
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Mean Duration (yrs) Number in Group
Surface Combatants 14.7 9
Submarines 15.2 5
Support Ships 6.2 6
Tactical Aircraft 14.7 15
Electronic Aircraft 14.3 12
Large Aircraft 13.5 8
Helicopters 19.8 17
Satellites 12.9 9
Tanks & Tracked Vehicles 14.8 5
2a. Proxy for Realistic Duration at MS B
4
Realistic duration at MS B 
2a
 We do not observe realistic duration, and previous studies 
provide no useful guidance about how to measure it.
 It seems a reasonable rule of thumb that the realistic duration 
will be longer, the greater the planned purchases at MS B.
 On this basis, the variable used is the ratio of planned quantity 
at MS B to mean planned quantity for the commodity class.
Variable name: normalized QMSB  




W Funding climate; proxy for competition for funding
DSARC 1 Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 1970–1982
DSARC 2 Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 1983–1986
DAB 1 Defense Acquisition Board 1987–1993
AR Acquisition Reform 1994–2000
DAB 2 Defense Acquisition Board 1987–1993
 Like estimated cost, the estimated schedule in the MS B baseline 
may be conditioned by the intensity of competition for funds.
 This is modeled here in the same way that cost growth was 
modeled in D. L. McNicol, Acquisition Policy, Cost Growth, and 
Cancellations of Major Defense Acquisition Programs, IDA Report 
R-8396, Sept. 2018. 
Variable Names
2c. Stretches due to Other factors
6
2c
 Stretches due to other factors fall into two main categories:
 Decisions to change the time period over which the same 
amount is acquired.
 Decisions to (in total) buy more or fewer of the system.
 We have no readily available way to model the first of these.
 The second can be represented as the ratio of the actual number 
of systems bought to the MS B baseline quantity.
Variable names
Q Growth Actual quantity procured divided by MS B quantity
VMR Marker for MDAPs that are a variant, modification, or remanufacture of a fielded system
Time Fiscal Year 1970 = 1
Results with Acquisition Policy Variables
Variable Estimated Coefficient P-Value
Intercept 0.601 < 0.001***
Normalized QMSB 0.1840 0.002***
W 0.014 0.918
DSARC1 -0.230 0.115
DSARC 2 -0.127 0.478
DAB 1 0.167 0.490
AR -0.037 0.880
DAB 2 -0.180 0.494




R2 = 0.322  N = 86.
The estimated coefficient of each of the acquisition policy variables is 
statistically insignificant, and one does not have the expected sign.
Results without Acquisition Policy Variables
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Variable Estimated Coefficient P-Value
Intercept 0.498 < 0.001***
Normalized QMSB 0.170 0.002***
W -0.063 0.490
Q Growth 0.166 0.062*
VMR -0.147 0.082*
Time 0.008 0.020**
R2 = 0.258  N = 86.
 Each of the estimated coefficients has the expected sign and each except 
funding climate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better.
 There is no indication that funding climate has a significant association with 
program duration, although the estimated coefficient does have the expected 
negative sign.
 The estimated coefficient of Time is positive and statistically significant.
Concluding Comments
 The results suggest three substantive conclusions:
1. Major changes in acquisition policies in effect at MS B apparently are 
not associated statistically with changes in MDAP duration.
2. There is evidence that the duration of MDAPs has become longer over 
time and that could perhaps be explained by the cumulative effects of 
changes in acquisition policy.
3. There is at best very slender evidence of an association of funding 
climate at MS B and duration. This does not rule out a pronounced 
effect on the duration of EMD alone.
 Three aspects of the modeling are novel and worth noting:
1. Normalization of duration by the mean duration of the commodity 
group.
2. Use of MS B quantity divided by the average MS B quantity of the 
commodity class as an independent variable.
3. Use of quantity growth as an independent variable.
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